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Section 7 of the Charter and the 
Common Law Rules of Evidence 
Hamish Stewart* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 
coincided, roughly, with the Supreme Court of Canada’s revolution in 
the common law of evidence. The Charter came into force in April 1982; 
the common law evidence revolution arguably began the next month, 
when the Supreme Court brusquely swept away the corroboration 
requirement for the testimony of accomplices.2 It would, no doubt, be 
possible to find links between these two developments, both doctrinally 
and in terms of the legal culture of the past 25 years; in particular, the 
boldness and creativity that the Court showed in the early Charter cases3 
may well have influenced its approach to other areas of the law, including 
the common law of evidence. But my interest here is in the more direct 
relationship that has emerged between section 7 of the Charter and the 
common law rules of evidence. The Court has on several occasions dealt 
                                                                                                            
*
 Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. A draft of this paper was prepared for the National 
Conference on the Charter and Criminal Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, September 29, 
2007. I am very grateful to Michael Code and Thomas Cromwell for their comments on the draft, 
and to Jamie Cameron and James Stribopoulos for the invitation to participate in the conference. 
1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 R. v. Vetrovec, [1982] S.C.J. No. 40, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811 (S.C.C.). Another case from 
the same year evincing a similar impatience with categorical rules is R. v. Graat, [1982] S.C.J. No. 102, 
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 819 (S.C.C.). Some might say that the evidence revolution began earlier, with Ares 
v. Venner, [1970] S.C.J. No. 26, [1970] S.C.R. 608 (S.C.C.) (admitting hearsay evidence in the 
absence of an existing common law or statutory exception) or later, with R. v. Khan, [1990] S.C.J. 
No. 81, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.) (same). On the revolution in the common law of evidence 
generally, see John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in 
Canada, 2d ed. Supplement (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2004), Chapter 1. 
3
 See, for instance, the early cases adopting a generous and purposive approach to the 
definition and limitation of Charter rights: Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation 
and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.); 
R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.); Reference re s. 94(2) of 
the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor 
Vehicle Reference”]; R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
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with the claim that a statutory change to the common law rules of evidence 
is unconstitutional because the change is inconsistent with the principles 
of fundamental justice. The Court’s response has usually been to reject 
the claim and uphold the statute, but in doing so, to vindicate the values 
underlying the common law rule in question, usually by an exercise in 
statutory interpretation that preserves the trial judge’s discretionary power 
to exclude evidence on the ground of excessive prejudice. Where this 
interpretation is not possible, the statute is vulnerable to invalidation. In 
cases where no formal constitutional issue arises, the Court has also 
tended to reinforce its revolutionary changes to the common law rules of 
evidence by intimating that they are consistent with, or perhaps even 
required by, section 7 of the Charter. 
This combination of constitutionally informed statutory interpretation 
and common law development could, in principle, lead to the recognition 
of a general right to the exclusion of patently unreliable evidence as a 
principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter.4 But, for 
a variety of doctrinal and pragmatic reasons, such a dramatic change to 
the law of evidence is unlikely; it is more likely, and perhaps more 
desirable, that the Supreme Court will continue to develop the existing 
rules of evidence with a view to reducing the amount of unreliable 
evidence that is put before triers of fact.5 Towards the end of this paper, 
I argue that, along these lines, recent undesirable developments in the 
common law confessions rule might be reversed if more attention was 
paid to the norm that underlies the relationship between section 7 and 
the common law rules of evidence: excessively prejudicial evidence is 
inadmissible. 
II. THE COMMON LAW OF EVIDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
1. Section 7: A Brief Overview 
Section 7 of the Charter reads as follows: 
                                                                                                            
4
 Compare David M. Paciocco, Charter Principles and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1987), at 335-91. 
5
 Compare Kent Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for 
Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52 Crim. 
L.Q. 210. 
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 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice. 
The approach to a section 7 claim in now well established. The 
claimant must first show that there is state conduct that affects one of 
the three protected interests — life, liberty or security of the person. The 
claimant must then identify a principle of fundamental justice and show 
that the way the state conduct affects his or her protected interest is not 
in accordance with that principle. If the claimant succeeds in demonstrating 
all of these elements, then he or she has established a violation of 
section 7 of the Charter. If the violation is not authorized by any statute, 
then it cannot be justified under section 1, and the claimant would be 
entitled to a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter. If a statute provides 
a discretion, itself constitutionally valid, that engages the section 7 interests, 
then section 7 requires the decision-maker to exercise the discretion 
properly.6 If a statute violates section 7, then in principle the violation 
might be justified under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit on 
the section 7 right. But the Supreme Court of Canada has never upheld a 
section 7 violation under section 1.7 For the purposes of this paper, I will 
assume that an evidentiary statute violating section 7 would not be upheld 
under section 1. If not justified under section 1, the statute would be 
declared of no force or effect pursuant to section 52(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982,8 and the claimant might also be entitled to a personal remedy 
under section 24(1) of the Charter. 
In criminal proceedings, section 7 is always applicable because the 
liberty interest is always engaged: if found guilty, the accused may be 
imprisoned.9 Thus, criminal proceedings always have to comply with the 
principles of fundamental justice. But what are these principles? In  
                                                                                                            
6
 As in extradition and deportation proceedings; see, for instance, Suresh v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
7
 On the high standard for upholding a s. 7 violation under s. 1, see Reference re s. 94(2) 
of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 518 (S.C.C.). This high 
standard has sometimes been interpreted as obviating the Oakes test except in extreme emergencies: 
see, for instance, Cheskes v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2007] O.J. No. 3515, 87 O.R. (3d) 581,  
at para. 138 (Ont. S.C.J.). There are some dissenting judgments that would have upheld a s. 7 violation 
under s. 1; notably, in R. v. Hess, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.), McLachlin J., 
dissenting, would have upheld a clear violation of the “no liability without fault” principle. 
8 
Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
9
 R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 89 (S.C.C.); 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at 
para. 18 (S.C.C.). 
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the Motor Vehicle Reference,10 the Court rejected the argument that the 
principles of fundamental justice should be equated with procedural 
fairness or natural justice; while the principles of fundamental justice 
certainly require procedural fairness,11 they also include substantive 
requirements.12 The early section 7 cases indicated, grandly if somewhat 
vaguely, that the principles of fundamental justice were to be found in 
“the basic tenets of our legal system”13 and, like sections 8 through 14 of 
the Charter, were “essential elements of a system for the administration 
of justice which is founded upon a belief in ‘the dignity and worth of the 
human person’ … and on ‘the rule of law’”.14 More recently, the Court 
has articulated a rather stringent three-part test for determining whether 
a proposed legal principle or rule is a principle of fundamental justice 
for section 7 purposes: 
[F]or a rule or principle to constitute a principle of fundamental justice 
for the purposes of s. 7, it must be a legal principle about which there 
is significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way in which 
the legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must be identified with 
sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against which to 
measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person.15 
So any assertion that a particular common law rule of evidence is a 
principle of fundamental justice must now be tested against this standard. 
A common law rule of evidence rule will typically satisfy the first and 
third criteria; given that these rules are routinely applied by trial judges, 
they are certainly legal principles that can be identified with sufficient 
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 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act  (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
11 See, for example, Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. 
No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). 
12
 See, for example, R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, 
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.) (a law must not be vague); R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 
3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (the fault element of a criminal offence must be proportionate to the seriousness 
of the offence); R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) (a law must 
not be overbroad in relation to its own purposes); Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) (a law must not be arbitrary). 
13
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.). 
14
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.), quoting from the preamble to the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 
1970, App. III, and from the preamble to the Charter. 
15 
R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 113 (S.C.C.); 
see also Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 
at 590-91 (S.C.C.); R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.). 
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precision. The question will be whether the rule is “fundamental to the 
way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate”, and this in turn 
will depend on how well the rule promotes the goals of the common law 
trial process: the search for truth, fairness to the parties, efficiency, the 
integrity of the administration of justice and other social values.16 
2. Common Law Values in the Rules of Evidence 
Section 7 is always engaged in criminal proceedings because the 
accused always faces a possible deprivation of liberty. So the rules of 
evidence, like any other aspect of the proceedings, must comply with 
the principles of fundamental justice. The rules of evidence in Canada 
remain largely a matter for development under the common law, subject 
to certain statutory changes. But are any of the common law rules of 
evidence principles of fundamental justice for the purposes of section 7 
of the Charter? This issue has been addressed in a series of cases involving 
statutory changes to the common law that have facilitated the prosecution 
of offences, particularly sexual offences. In these cases, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has generally rejected the argument that any particular 
common law rule of evidence is a principle of fundamental justice, but 
in so doing, the Court has in effect constitutionalized certain of the values 
underlying the common law rules. The usual response to these section 7 
challenges has been to interpret the statute as preserving some important 
aspect of the common law and, with that interpretation in place, to reject 
the challenge. 
At common law, a trial judge has the power to exclude evidence 
where, in the trial judge’s view, the prejudicial effect of the evidence 
outweighs its probative value.17 This power is sometimes called a 
“discretion”, and it is discretionary in the limited sense that the trial 
judge’s assessment of prejudicial effect and probative value is entitled to 
considerable deference on appeal. But there is an important sense in which 
the exercise of the power is not discretionary: if the trial judge concludes 
that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs the probative value, 
                                                                                                            
16 
This list of objectives is based on John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, 
The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d ed. Supplement (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2004), at 8-10. 
17 
For a review of the different formulations of this power, see R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 
S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 610-11 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J. 
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he or she must exclude it.18 I will refer to this power as the “discretionary 
exclusionary power”. 
Rather than constitutionalizing any particular common law rule of 
evidence, the Supreme Court of Canada has effectively constitutionalized 
the discretionary exclusionary power by rejecting Charter challenges to 
statutes while interpreting them as preserving the power. As Rosenberg 
put it some years ago, “the courts have been remarkably resistant to 
using the Charter to strike down evidentiary rules … [and] have found 
that it is much more useful to uphold the existing rule, while giving to 
the trial judge a greater discretion in applying the evidentiary rules.”19 
This process may be illustrated with reference to four cases decided 
between 1988 and 1993. 
 Under section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act,20 any witness “may 
be questioned as to whether the witness has been convicted of any 
offence”. It is well established that section 12 applies to the accused as a 
witness, if the accused chooses to testify at his or her own trial. In R. v. 
Corbett,21 the accused argued that the application of section 12 to an 
accused person infringed the right to a fair trial guaranteed by section 
11(d) of the Charter.22 The Court rejected this argument, but only after 
interpreting section 12 as preserving the discretionary exclusionary power.23 
Indeed, Beetz J., speaking for himself, was clearly of the view that 
section 12 would offend section 7 if it could not be read as incorporating 
the discretion.24 
In R. v. Potvin,25 the accused challenged what is now section 715 of 
the Criminal Code.26 This section creates an exception to the rule against 
hearsay for a transcript of a witness’s testimony from a previous proceeding 
on the same charge where the witness “refuses to be sworn or to give 
                                                                                                            
18
 Compare R. v. Handy, [2002] S.C.J. No. 57, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, 164 C.C.C. (3d) 481 
at para. 153 (S.C.C.). 
19
 Marc Rosenberg, “The Impact of the Charter on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases”, 
in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 
181, at 191. 
20
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
21
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.). 
22
 Thus R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.) is not, strictly 
speaking, a s. 7 case, but it is well established that the right to a fair trial is also a principle of 
fundamental justice under s. 7. 
23 
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at 729-40 (S.C.C.), per  
La Forest J., dissenting on other grounds. 
24 
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at 699 (S.C.C.), per Beetz J. 
25 
[1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.). 
26
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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evidence” or can be shown to be dead, insane, too ill to testify or absent 
from Canada, and where “the evidence was taken in the presence of the 
accused”, unless “the accused did not have full opportunity to cross-
examine the witness.” The accused Potvin, along with Deschênes and 
another, were charged with murder. However, the Crown proceeded 
against the accused separately, and called Deschênes as a witness at the 
accused’s preliminary inquiry. The accused was committed for trial. At 
trial, Deschênes refused to testify, and the Crown relied on section 715 
to put his preliminary inquiry testimony before the jury. The accused 
argued that it was a principle of fundamental justice that he should have 
the opportunity to cross-examine all the witnesses against him at trial; 
accordingly, section 715 offended section 7. The Court rejected this 
argument, holding instead that section 7 required that “the accused 
have… a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness when the previous 
testimony was taken if a transcript of such testimony is to be introduced 
as evidence in a criminal trial for the purpose of convicting the accused”.27 
But the court also interpreted section 715 as preserving the discretionary 
exclusionary power;28 indeed, Wilson J. for the majority interpreted it as 
providing an even broader exclusionary discretion. 
In R. v. L. (D.O.),29 the Court considered a constitutional challenge to 
section 715.1 of the Criminal Code,30 which provides for the admission 
of a video recording of a statement of a young witness “made within a 
reasonable time after the alleged offence” and describing the offence, if 
the witness “adopts the contents” of the video recording while testifying.31 
Such a video recording would probably not be admissible, absent the 
statute. If offered for the truth of its contents, it would be hearsay, and if 
it merely repeated the witness’s testimony, it would be a prior consistent 
statement; it would therefore be admissible only under a common law 
exception to one of these rules. The accused argued that the rule against 
hearsay and the rule against the admission of prior consistent statements 
were principles of fundamental justice and that section 715.1 was 
                                                                                                            
27 R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at 543 (S.C.C.). 
28
 R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at 551-52, per Wilson J. and at 532, 
per La Forest J. (S.C.C.). 
29
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.). 
30
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
31
 When R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.) was decided,  
s. 715.1 was applicable only to complainants in sexual cases, and spoke of a “videotape”; it has 
since been broadened to all witnesses who are under 18 at the time of the alleged offence and to all 
forms of “video recording”. The words I have quoted in the text appear in both the former and the 
current versions of the section. 
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unconstitutional because it created exceptions to those rules. The Court 
rejected these arguments.32 On the assumption that the section did create 
the exceptions to the common law rules suggested by the accused,33 the 
Court rejected the claim that these rules were principles of fundamental 
justice; rather, the governing principle of fundamental justice was the 
right to a fair trial. Section 715.1 did not infringe the right to a fair trial, in 
particular because it was read as preserving the discretionary exclusionary 
power.34 
Finally, and perhaps most notoriously, in R. v. Seaboyer35 the Court 
constitutionalized a version of the discretionary exclusionary power as it 
applies to evidence led by the defence. A proper appreciation of the 
significance of Seaboyer requires a brief explanation of the common law 
background. At common law, the complainant in a sexual case could be 
questioned about her sexual history, based on the assumption that an 
unchaste woman was more likely to consent to sexual activity and less 
likely to be truthful. While independent proof of the complainant’s sexual 
history was limited by other rules of evidence,36 neither the complainant’s 
testimony, nor the independent proof (to the extent that it was admissible) 
concerning her sexual history would be excluded on the ground that its 
prejudicial effect exceeded its probative value. Indeed, at common  
law, there was good authority for the proposition that the discretionary 
                                                                                                            
32 
The lengthiest and most thoroughly reasoned judgment was delivered by L’Heureux-
Dubé J., Gonthier J. concurring. The majority judgment, delivered by Lamer C.J.C., La Forest, 
Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, and Iacobucci JJ. concurring, basically agrees with L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s 
analysis of the constitutional issues; it appears that the need for a separate concurring judgment was 
due to the majority’s reluctance to accept everything that L’Heureux-Dubé J. had to say about the 
policy objectives of s. 715.1. Justice Major, speaking for himself, was content to state that he 
agreed with L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s disposition of the constitutional questions. I will refer mainly to 
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s reasons. 
33 
The Court expresses some doubt as to whether s. 715.1 creates an exception to the rule 
against hearsay, but L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s explanation of why the video recording is not a prior 
consistent statement clearly shows that the video recording is indeed hearsay: “The videotaped 
evidence is the only evidence before the court with regard to the details of the child’s sexual abuse. 
It is, in fact, the evidence itself, as if the child were giving it in open court or in lieu of open court 
evidence.” (R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, at 458 (S.C.C.), original 
emphasis). The video recording cannot be “the evidence” against the accused unless it is accepted 
for the truth of the events that the witness describes in the recording; consequently, a video 
recording admitted under s. 715.1 is hearsay. 
34 
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, at 461 (S.C.C.); compare at 429, 
per Lamer C.J.C. 
35 
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.). 
36 
See Hamish Stewart, Sexual Offences in Canadian Law (looseleaf) (Aurora, ON: Canada 
Law Book, 2004), at §7:400.10. 
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exclusionary power simply did not apply to evidence tendered by the 
defence.37 
In 1983, as part of a major reform of the sexual offences, Parliament 
enacted a predecessor to what is now section 276 of the Criminal Code.38 
This statute provided that evidence of the complainant’s sexual history 
was admissible only in three narrow and well-defined situations. Two 
accused persons, in separate proceedings, challenged section 276 of the 
Criminal Code, arguing that its abrogation of the common law rules of 
evidence infringed their section 7 right to make full answer and defence. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, rejecting the assumptions underlying 
the common law rules, was unanimously of the view that a trier of fact 
could not legitimately base inferences about either consent or credibility 
on evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual activity; accordingly, to 
the extent that section 276 excluded evidence that supported only those 
inferences, it did not offend the Charter. But a majority of the Court, per 
McLachlin J., agreed that section 276 was nonetheless unconstitutional. 
First, McLachlin J. identified the following principle of fundamental  
justice: “the prejudice must substantially outweigh the value of the evidence 
before a judge can exclude evidence relevant to a defence allowed by 
law.”39 This constitutional principle, though narrower than the common 
law rule that the discretionary exclusionary power did not apply to defence 
evidence, significantly limits the legislature’s power to modify the rules 
of evidence in penal proceedings. Second, McLachlin J. outlined a number 
of hypothetical situations in which section 276 would exclude evidence 
of the complainant’s sexual activity even though that evidence could 
support legitimate inferences and even though the prejudicial effect of 
the evidence would not substantially outweigh its probative value with 
respect to those inferences. Accordingly, section 276 was struck down.40 
But, in striking section 276 down, the Court did not simply revive the 
                                                                                                            
37 
In the words of Martin J.A., “no discretion exists to exclude relevant evidence offered 
by an accused on the ground that it is prejudicial to the Crown”: R. v. Valley, [1986] O.J. No. 77,  
26 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 239 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1986] 1 S.C.R. xiii (S.C.C.); see 
also R. v. Hawke, [1975] O.J. No. 2200, 22 C.C.C. (2d) 19, at 54-55 (Ont. C.A.).  
38 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. For a discussion of an earlier version of the statutory prohibition 
on questioning the complainant about her sexual history, see Hamish Stewart, Sexual Offences in 
Canadian Law (looseleaf) (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2004), at §7:400.20. 
39 
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 611 (S.C.C.). 
40 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, in one of her most famous dissents, held that s. 276 did not 
exclude any evidence that could, in a decision-making atmosphere free of false stereotypes about 
women’s behaviour, support legitimate inferences; consequently, she would have rejected the s. 7 
challenge altogether. 
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common law as it stood before the reforms of the 1970s; instead, it put 
in place a new and very detailed common law rule governing the admission 
of evidence of a complainant’s sexual conduct.41 
In my view, these four cases — R. v. Corbett,42 R. v. Potvin,43 R. v. 
L. (D.O.)44 and R. v. Seaboyer45 — give constitutional status to the trial 
judge’s discretionary exclusionary power. It is a principle of fundamental 
justice that a trial judge must have the power to exclude evidence tendered 
by the Crown where the prejudicial effect of that evidence outweighs its 
probative value. While it is true that the Court has never expressly stated 
that this rule is a principle of fundamental justice, in light of these cases, 
there is little doubt that a statute that could not be interpreted so as to 
respect it would violate section 7.46 Moreover, it is a recognized principle 
of fundamental justice that a trial judge must have the power to admit 
evidence tendered by the defence unless its prejudicial effect substantially 
outweighs its probative value. An evidentiary statute that limits or removes 
this power in criminal proceedings (or any other proceedings where life, 
liberty or security of the person is at stake) therefore infringes section 7. 
Wherever possible, the Court will read statutes that modify the common 
law rules of evidence as preserving the discretionary exclusionary power. 
But there is a strong argument to be made that these principles of 
fundamental justice were not, historically speaking, very deeply rooted 
in the common law of Canada. In 1970, the Supreme Court of Canada 
said that the discretionary exclusionary power extended only to “evidence 
gravely prejudicial to the accused, the admissibility of which is tenuous, 
and whose probative force in relation to the main issue before the court 
is trifling”.47 As late as 1989, only two years before R. v. Seaboyer,48  
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R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 634-36 (S.C.C.). When 
Parliament enacted the current version of s. 276 — its third attempt to create a satisfactory limit on 
the questioning of the complainant — it followed this new common law rule very closely. Unsurprisingly, 
the new s. 276 survived constitutional challenge: see R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, [2000]  
2 S.C.R. 443 (S.C.C.). 
42 
R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.). 
43 
R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.). 
44 
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.). 
45 
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.). 
46 
Compare Rollie Thompson, “Rounding Up the Usual Criminal Suspects, and a Few More 
Civil Ones: Section 7 after Chaoulli” (2007) 20 N.J.C.L. 129, at 160. The constitutionalization of 
the discretionary exclusionary power was anticipated by David M. Paciocco, Charter Principles 
and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 430-32. 
47 
R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272, at 293 (S.C.C.); see also Marc 
Rosenberg, “The Impact of the Charter on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases”, in Jamie Cameron, 
ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 181, at 181-83; 
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a majority of the court seemed to think that the Wray formulation still 
governed.49 And, on the other side of the coin, the discretion did not extend 
to evidence tendered by the defence;50 evidence led by the accused was, 
of course, subject to the ordinary rules of evidence, but those rules could 
be relaxed in the accused’s favour.51 Moreover, although the Court’s 
approach to the constitutional question in Seaboyer was deeply rooted in 
the nature of the common law trial process, the remedy was not simply 
to revive a discredited common law approach but to promulgate a 
statute-like common law rule motivated by common law values. 
Thus, while the Court is very reluctant to constitutionalize any 
particular common law rule of evidence, even one as fundamental as the 
rule against hearsay, it is quite willing to constitutionalize the values 
underlying the rule. This willingness is most clearly seen in its 
constitutionalization of the discretionary exclusionary power. The purposes 
of this power are to protect the integrity of the common law trial process 
from evidence that is so unreliable, inflammatory or otherwise unfair 
that a party should not be required to respond to it, and to keep the trial 
process focused on the real issues between the parties. By reading statutory 
incursions on the common law rules of evidence as subject to the 
discretionary exclusionary power, the Court protects these purposes 
while giving Parliament considerable scope to amend the rules of evidence 
to respond to deficiencies in the common law. 
3. Intimations of Constitutionality 
In cases where a statute is not in issue, the Court has not had to directly 
face the question of whether the common law rules of evidence are 
principles of fundamental justice; but the Court has often intimated that 
some aspects of the common law support constitutionally guaranteed rights, 
or vice versa. Most famously, the Court drew extensively on some aspects 
                                                                                                            
David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), at 
33-34. 
48 
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.). 
49 
R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at 552 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J. 
(Lamer and Sopinka JJ. concurring). Justice La Forest, speaking for himself and Dickson C.J.C., 
rejected the Wray formulation but nonetheless described the discretionary exclusionary power in 
stringent terms. He held (at 531) that s. 715 left “room for the operation of the ordinary principles 
of the law of evidence, including the rule that the trial judge may exclude admissible evidence if its 
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value”.  
50 
See note 37. 
51 
Compare R. v. Williams, [1985] O.J. No. 2489, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.). 
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of the common law to recognize a constitutionally protected right to silence 
under section 7 of the Charter.52 Moreover, the Court has on several 
occasions expressly stated that some aspect of the common law rules of 
evidence is consonant with section 7 values; as David Paciocco puts it in 
his contribution to this conference, the Court has left “Charter tracks” on 
the common law of evidence.53 In developing the principled approach to 
hearsay in R. v. Khelawon, the Court has indicated that “difficulties in 
testing the evidence, or conversely the inability to present reliable evidence, 
may impact on an accused’s ability to make full answer and defence, a 
right protected by s. 7”.54 In delineating the broad scope of the accused’s 
right to cross-examine in R. v. Lyttle, the Court has stated that “the right 
of an accused to cross-examine prosecution witnesses … is an essential 
component of the right to make a full answer and defence” which is 
“protected by ss. 7 and 11(d)”.55 In reformulating the test for the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence in R. v. Handy, the Court stated 
that a “verdict … based on prejudice rather than proof … undermin[es] 
the presumption of innocence enshrined in ss. 7 and 11(d)”.56 These last 
three cases — R. v. Khelawon, R. v. Lyttle, and R. v. Handy — were all 
unanimous decisions intended to clarify, in a principled way, various 
difficult points of the common law of evidence. It is true that none of 
them involved a constitutional challenge to a statute, so that the Court 
was not required to decide the precise implications of the principles of 
fundamental justice for the rule against hearsay, the right to cross-examine 
or the admissibility of similar facts, but it is nonetheless striking that the 
Court was prepared to intimate that its reformulation of the common law 
rule in question might be required by the principles of fundamental justice. 
                                                                                                            
52 
R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.). 
53 
David Paciocco, “Charter Tracks: Twenty-Five Years of Constitutional Influence on the 
Criminal Trial Process and Rules of Evidence”, in this volume. 
54 
R. v. Khelawon, [2006] S.C.J. No. 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, at para. 47 (S.C.C.). 
55 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 476, at paras. 41 and 43 (S.C.C.). 
56 
R. v. Handy, [2002] S.C.J. No. 57, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, 164 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 139 
(S.C.C.). Compare R. v. Terezakis, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1592, 223 C.C.C. (3d) 344, at paras. 45-46 
(B.C.C.A.).  
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III. UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
1. A Right against Unreliable Evidence? 
An important theme runs through both types of cases discussed in the 
previous section: the link between the accused’s right to a fair trial and 
the trial judge’s role in excluding unreliable evidence. So it is tempting 
to argue that Canadian courts should recognize a general section 7 Charter 
right against the admission of patently unreliable evidence. It might  
be argued that this right is implicit in the constitutionalization of the 
discretionary exclusionary power, insofar as one type of prejudicial 
effect is the concern that the trier of fact will give excessive weight to 
unreliable evidence. Moreover, this right would be entirely consistent 
with the intimations of constitutionality that have helped to inform the 
development of the common law of evidence in the Charter era, notably 
in R. v. Khelawon,57 where it was suggested that the exclusion of 
unreliable evidence under the principled approach to hearsay might be 
required by the section 7 right to a fair trial. 
However, it has to be said that Canadian courts have not, so far, been 
receptive to recognizing a right to the exclusion of unreliable evidence 
as such. In R. v. Buric,58 the trial judge found that the proposed testimony 
of a Crown witness had been tainted by the manner in which the police 
had interviewed the witness, and excluded the evidence on the ground that 
its admission would make the trial unfair. The accused were acquitted. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding that the apparent 
unreliability of the evidence was not a ground for excluding it; the issues 
of credibility raised by the police interview could be explored in cross-
examination. Justice Labrosse commented that “The admission of evidence 
which may be unreliable does not per se render a trial unfair.”59 The 
Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. In R. v. Osmar,60 
the accused sought exclusion of his statement to an undercover police 
officer in a “Mr. Big” scenario. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
there was no Charter ground for exclusion61 and that, at common law, 
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[2006] S.C.J. No. 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 (S.C.C.). 
58 
[1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.). 
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R. v. Buric, [1996] O.J. No. 1657, 28 O.R. (3d) 737, at 750 (Ont. C.A.) (original emphasis), 
affd [1997] S.C.J. No. 38, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 (S.C.C.). 
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[2007] O.J. No. 244, 84 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.).  
61 
R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 84 O.R. (3d) 321, at paras. 25-47 (Ont. C.A.). 
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such a statement could be excluded only in accordance with the fourth 
branch of the confessions rule as articulated in R. v. Rothman,62 that is, 
only if the conduct of the police in obtaining the statement would shock 
the conscience.63 In R. v. Duguay,64 the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
rejected the suggestion that a trial judge, in applying the discretionary 
exclusionary power, should always consider the reliability or unreliability 
of proposed Crown evidence. Although the Court noted that an assessment 
of threshold reliability is now required for certain decisions about 
admissibility, it held that this assessment should not apply generally to 
all evidence, because of the dangers of usurping “the role of the jury in 
our criminal justice system” and making “the voir dire process … more 
onerous than the trial on the merits”.65 Strikingly, the facts of the case 
involved the proposed testimony of a jailhouse informant; notwithstanding 
the well-documented frailties of such evidence,66 the Court followed  
R. v. Brooks67 and held that, in the circumstances, a Vetrovec warning 
relating to the jailhouse informant would have been sufficient.68 
There is much to be said for the view that requiring a showing of 
threshold reliability as a precondition for the admission of every piece 
of evidence would fundamentally change the nature of the trial process, 
and not necessarily for the better: the gain in the quality of the information 
put before the trier of fact might well be offset by the increased length 
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[1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
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R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 84 O.R. (3d) 321, at paras. 48-54 (Ont. C.A.). 
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[2007] N.B.J. No. 337 (N.B.C.A.). 
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R. v. Duguay, [2007] N.B.J. No. 337, at para. 56 (N.B.C.A.). Compare David M. Paciocco 
& Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), at 41, which the Court 
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See Kent Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for Excluding 
Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 210, 
at 225-28. 
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R. v. Brooks, [2000] S.C.J. No. 12, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 237 (S.C.C.). 
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R. v. Duguay, [2007] N.B.J. No. 337, at paras. 58-61 (N.B.C.A.). The accused was charged 
with first degree murder and counselling the commission of another first degree murder. The theory 
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The theory of the defence was that one Bernier was responsible for the killings. The case against 
Duguay rested essentially on the testimony of his alleged accomplices, who had admitted their 
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was inadmissible. The accused was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, the Court of Appeal held 
that the trial judge had erred in excluding the evidence on this ground, but nonetheless dismissed 
the Crown’s appeal because the error could not have affected the verdict. 
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and complexity of the process itself.69 But there is also much to be said 
for the view that, where courts have repeatedly recognized that there are 
systematic reasons why a certain kind of evidence is unreliable, the 
common law should recognize those systematic reasons by requiring an 
assessment of threshold reliability for that kind of evidence.70 Like the 
principled approach to hearsay, this development would at least be 
consistent with, if not required by, the constitutional fair trial right of 
accused persons. In the next part of this paper, I suggest how the 
common law confessions rule might be revisited along these lines. 
2. The Confessions Rule Revisited 
At common law, a statement by an accused person to a person not in 
authority is admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception for party 
admissions. But a statement to a person that the accused knows to be a 
person in authority must be proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have 
been voluntarily made before the Crown can use it against the accused 
for any purpose. Until recently, the voluntariness requirement could be 
stated as follows. To demonstrate voluntariness, the Crown had to negate, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, three tainting factors. First, an inducement 
— a threat or a promise — would make the statement involuntary and 
inadmissible.71 Second, a statement that was not a product of the accused’s 
“operating mind” would be considered involuntary and inadmissible.72 
Third, notwithstanding the absence of an inducement and the presence 
of an operating mind, a statement obtained under oppressive circumstances 
would be involuntary and inadmissible.73 In addition to these three grounds 
of involuntariness, the Supreme Court has recognized that a statement to 
a person in authority, whether or not the accused knew that the person 
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Some might say we have already gone a long way down this road: see, for instance, 
Michael Moldaver, “A Trial Judge’s Perspective on the Charter”, in Jamie Cameron, ed., The 
Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 143.  
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Compare Kent Roach, “Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for 
Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions” (2007) 52 Crim. 
L.Q. 210.  
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This classic branch of the voluntariness rule originates in Ibrahim v. The King, [1914] 
A.C. 599 (P.C.). 
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R. v. Ward, [1979] S.C.J. No. 29, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.); see also the rather 
restrictive formulation of the operating mind requirement in R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, 
[1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 941-42 (S.C.C.). 
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R. v. Hobbins, [1982] S.C.J. No. 25, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 553 (S.C.C.). 
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was in authority, may be excluded at common law if it is obtained by 
means of a trick that would shock the conscience of Canadians.74 
The confessions rule is as deeply rooted and as important to the 
criminal trial process as any other common law rule of evidence, so it 
might seem natural to hold that the confessions rule is a principle of 
fundamental justice for section 7 purposes. But it has not been necessary 
for the Supreme Court to take this step because there has rarely been 
any legislative incursion on the common law rule.75 Moreover, as 
Iacobucci J. pointed out in R. v. Oickle, there are at least three important 
structural differences between the common law confessions rule and an 
argument for exclusion under the Charter: 
First, the confessions rule has a broader scope than the Charter. For 
example, the protections of s. 10 only apply on “arrest or detention”. 
By contrast, the confessions rule applies whenever a person in authority 
questions a suspect. Second, the Charter applies a different burden and 
standard of proof from that under the confessions rule. Under the former, 
the burden is on the accused to show, on a balance of probabilities,  
a violation of constitutional rights. Under the latter, the burden is on 
the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession 
was voluntary. Finally, the remedies are different. The Charter excludes 
evidence obtained in violation of its provisions under s. 24(2) only if 
admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. … By contrast, a violation of the confessions rule always 
warrants exclusion.76 
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But see R. v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475 (S.C.C.), where the 
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Would evidence derived from an involuntary statement be admissible, as at common law, or would 
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These differences point to the difficulty of conceptualizing the 
confessions rule under the Charter. Should the confessions rule, including 
its rule of automatic exclusion, simply be imported wholesale into section 
7,77 so that there would be no resort to section 24(2)? Should police 
conduct that results in an involuntary statement be conceptualized as a 
violation of the accused’s rights, leading to an argument for exclusion 
under section 24(2)?78 Should the extension of the confessions rule to 
include police conduct that shocks the community be incorporated into 
section 7? 
The Supreme Court has recently addressed some of these structural 
questions in R. v. Singh.79 The majority held that in the particular context 
where the accused is detained and knows he or she is speaking to a person 
in authority, the common law confessions rule and the section 7 right to 
silence are “functionally equivalent”, meaning that the same result, in 
terms of the admissibility of the accused’s statement, will follow no 
matter which inquiry the trial judge embarks upon.80 More specifically, 
the majority held that where the accused was detained and the Crown can 
establish voluntariness, the accused will be unable to establish a breach 
of the right to silence, and that where the accused is able to establish a 
breach of the right to silence, the Crown will be unable to establish 
voluntariness.81 But the Court did not hold (at least not expressly) that an 
involuntarily obtained statement is always a breach of the right to silence. 
While the Court’s recognition of the confessions rule as, in some sense, 
a principle of fundamental justice is welcome, recent developments in 
this area of the law are not consistent with its constitutionalized status. 
The content of the rule has been diluted to the point that it may permit 
the admission of unreliable and unfairly obtained evidence. In particular, 
the Court has refused to extend the protection of the confessions rule to 
statements to persons not in authority even when the circumstances in 
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In my view, this is the effect of R. v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475 
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[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583 (S.C.C.). 
81 R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 583, at para. 8 (S.C.C.). 
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which the statement was made cast serious doubt on the reliability of the 
statement, and where the statement is given to a person in authority, the 
Court appears to have weakened the traditional common law concept of 
voluntariness. 
As noted above, the trend in the cases that confront section 7 with 
statutory changes to the common law of evidence is not to constitutionalize 
any particular rule of evidence but to preserve the trial judge’s discretionary 
exclusionary power. The reason for preserving that power is to protect 
the accused’s right to a fair trial by preventing the Crown from leading 
evidence that would operate unfairly against him. And the confessions 
rule is at least in part motivated by the same concern: an involuntary 
confession is likely to be unreliable. Since we know both that there are 
many reasons why someone might confess falsely and that jurors find it 
difficult to believe that anyone would confess falsely, the confessions 
rule requires proof of voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt before a 
jury can hear an accused’s statement to a person in authority. In addition, 
the confession rule is supported by the principle against self-incrimination, 
the “the overarching principle” of our criminal process,82 and by the 
concern that the accused be fairly treated when in police custody. 
If the relevant principle of fundamental justice is not any particular 
common law rule of evidence but the idea that a person should not have 
to defend himself or herself against evidence that is unreliable or unfairly 
obtained, then section 7 would support revisiting two aspects of the 
confessions rule. First, the Court should reconsider its reluctance to 
exclude statements to persons not in authority.83 The rule that a statement 
by the accused to a person not in authority is admissible is a simple 
application of the party admissions exception to the rule against hearsay. 
The party admission exception is motivated not so much by the inherent 
reliability of party admissions — there are all sorts of reasons why these 
statements might be unreliable — but by the role of party admissions in 
the adversarial system.84 The party against whom the statement is led 
cannot complain that he or she lacks an opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant; he or she is the declarant, and so can take the stand to explain, 
or to deny having made, the out-of-court statement. So reliability seems 
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not to be the issue when a trial judge is considering a party admission. 
But even this rationale should yield where the statement is given in 
circumstances that cast serious doubt on its reliability. The rigid 
application of this rule has led to statements being admitted where the 
accused was assaulted and threatened with death,85 unlawfully confined,86 
or subject to intense pressure from a purported gang87 — conduct that,  
if committed by a person in authority, would clearly make the statement 
inadmissible. The accused can, of course, seek to demonstrate before the 
trier of fact that the circumstances in which the statement was made 
should lead them to disbelieve it, but we know that jurors find it difficult 
to believe that a person would falsely confess, even under pressure, and 
it is partly for this reason that statements to persons in authority are 
inadmissible unless voluntary. The Court should recognize that sometimes 
a statement to a person not in authority can be made in circumstances 
that render it so unreliable as to be inadmissible. 
This recognition, though, need not be as radical as requiring the 
Crown to prove all statements by the accused to be voluntary beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Rather, statements to persons not in authority should 
be made subject to the discretionary exclusionary power, a principle of 
evidence law that we already know to be a principle of fundamental 
justice. So a confession to a person not in authority should be excluded 
if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. A classic form of 
prejudicial effect is the concern that the jury may give undue weight to a 
particular kind of evidence; since we know that jurors tend to overvalue 
confessions, they should not be admitted unless their probative value 
outweighs that prejudicial effect.88 For example, a confession obtained 
under threat of death has in most cases virtually no probative value 
because anyone would comply with the threat rather than risk death by 
maintaining his or her innocence, so almost any degree of prejudicial 
effect, that is almost any likelihood that the jury would accept the 
statement despite its unreliability, would outweigh its probative value. 
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Other circumstances might be less likely to produce an unreliable statement 
and so would generate a smaller prejudicial effect. 
Second, recognizing the connection between the section 7 fair trial 
right and the common law confessions rule should lead the Court to 
reconsider recent developments which threaten to seriously erode the 
confessions rule. As noted above, the common law confessions rule 
traditionally had three reasonably well-defined branches: a statement 
could be rendered involuntary by an inducement, lack of an operating 
mind or oppression. But R. v. Oickle, R. v. Spencer and R. v. Singh89 seem 
to have significantly altered this approach, in both structure and content. 
In Oickle, Iacobucci J. held that challenges to voluntariness should not 
be categorized; instead, a trial judge should “strive to understand the 
circumstances surrounding the confession and ask if it gives rise to a 
reasonable doubt as to the confession’s voluntariness, taking into account 
all the aspects of the rule”.90 The Court’s rejection of a pigeonholing 
approach to voluntariness is consistent with the trend of the law of 
evidence towards a principled approach. But other aspects of Oickle are 
troubling. The Court introduced novel elements into the assessment of 
voluntariness: the question of whether there was a quid pro quo for the 
accused’s statement and the suggestion that what really mattered was 
whether the accused’s will was “overborne”.91 These elements become 
even more significant in Spencer and Singh. Spencer holds that, in contrast 
to the traditional English position,92 the mere presence of an inducement 
is not enough: “it is the strength of the inducement, having regard to the 
particular individual and his or her circumstances, that is to be considered 
in the overall contextual analysis”.93 Singh and Spencer appear to confirm, 
in contrast to all precedent before Oickle, that the test for involuntariness 
is not whether the statement is tainted by inducement, lack of operating 
mind or oppression, but whether the accused’s will has been overborne.94 
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In the case of a threat, for example, it is arguably not enough that the 
threat induced the detainee to speak; rather, it seems that the effect of 
the threat must be so powerful that the detainee’s will must have been 
overborne.95 Oickle, Spencer and Singh were intended to put the 
confessions rule on a principled rather than a categorical basis;96 however, 
the result of these cases appears to be that the protections accorded by 
the traditional concepts of voluntariness are weakened to the point where 
unreliable confessions may well be admissible. 
In light of these cases, it is quite possible that the police could make 
an explicit promise or threat, and the accused could make a statement in 
response, yet the statement could be found to be voluntary because the 
accused’s will was not “overborne”: the accused chose to speak. The 
very fact that would traditionally have made the statement inadmissible 
would now indicate voluntariness. This approach would amount to a radical 
departure from the insight underlying the common law confessions rule, 
which was that a statement could be rendered unreliable by a wide variety 
of motives to speak, and that the only motive likely to produce a reliable 
statement was a genuine willingness, protected as far as possible from 
extraneous motives, to speak. There are many circumstances other than 
an “overborne will” that can prompt a suspect to speak to authorities: to 
get bail, to avoid an apparent threat from the police, to mitigate what 
appears to be a powerful prosecution case, to find favour with police 
and prosecutors, to protect friends or family members. None of these 
circumstances requires the will to be “overborne”; any of them could 
prompt an unreliable statement. And unreliable evidence is prejudicial 
evidence; it invites conclusions about guilt that rest on inadequate 
foundations. 
If it really is the case that Oickle,97 Spencer98 and Singh99 have replaced 
the classic questions of whether the accused’s statement was tainted by 
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inducement, lack of operating mind or oppression with the question of 
whether the accused’s will was overborne, then there is a serious danger 
that statements traditionally regarded as unreliable will now be admissible 
under the confessions rule; that is, there is a serious danger that these 
statements will be admitted even though their prejudicial effect outweighs 
their probative value. And there is nothing in these cases to suggest that 
the Court has rejected the common law’s long-standing reasons for thinking 
that involuntarily obtained statements were unreliable;100 if anything, the 
Court’s reference in Oickle to selected social scientific evidence concerning 
false confessions reinforces rather than undermines those reasons.101  
If the discretionary exclusionary power is a principle of fundamental 
justice, to comply with section 7 of the Charter, the recent erosion of the 
confessions rule in Oickle and Spencer should be reversed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between section 7 of the Charter and the common 
law rules of evidence has been direct but subtle. The Supreme Court has 
in general avoided constitutionalizing any particular common law rule 
of evidence, but has worked hard to preserve, even to extend, the trial 
judge’s discretionary exclusionary power — that is, the power to exclude 
otherwise admissible evidence where its probative value is outweighed 
(or, in the case of defence evidence, substantially outweighed) by its  
prejudicial effect. It is clear that the Court regards the discretionary 
exclusionary power as a principle of fundamental justice. Moreover, the 
Court has on several occasions intimated that various aspects of its  
revolution in the common law of evidence — the development of a 
principled approach to a variety of formerly categorical decisions about 
admissibility — accord with, or are even required by, the principles of 
fundamental justice. In this paper, I have suggested that while it is unlikely 
that the Court will subordinate the entire common law of evidence to the 
discretionary exclusionary power, keeping the constitutional status of 
the discretionary exclusionary power in mind might help to reverse the 
recent erosion of the common law confessions rule. 
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